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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18168| Title: | Cartel Stability and Economic Integration |
| Keywords: | F15 F12 L12 L13 ddc:330 Collusive behavior trade liberalisation specific tariffs market access cost Kartell Wettbewerbsbeschränkung Aussenhandelsliberalisierung Wirtschaftsintegration Zolltheorie Kosten Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
| Description: | This paper investigates the effect of economic integration on the ability of firms to maintain a collusive understanding about staying out of each other?s markets. The paper distinguishes among different types of trade costs: ad valorem, unit, fixed. It is shown that for a sufficient reduction of ad valorem trade costs, a cartel supported by collusion on either quantities or prices will be weakened, thus integration is pro-competitive. If integration consists of a reductions in unit (fixed) trade costs a price setting cartel is strengthened (unaffected), while a quantity setting one is weakened. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18168 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18168 ppn:390960861 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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