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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18160| Title: | The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly |
| Keywords: | L13 D43 L41 ddc:330 Takeover bidding Merger incentives Oligopoly Übernahme Fusion Oligopol Duopol Ökonomischer Anreiz Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
| Description: | We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders´ share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and more likely under Cournot competition if goods are complements. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18160 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18160 ppn:390614343 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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