The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18160

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Inderst, Roman	-
dc.creator	Wey, Christian	-
dc.date	2004	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T06:58:32Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T06:58:32Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18160	-
dc.identifier	ppn:390614343	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18160	-
dc.description	We present a model of takeover where the target optimally sets its reserve price. Under relatively standard symmetry restrictions, we obtain a unique equilibrium. The probability of takeover is only a function of the number of firms and of the insiders´ share of total industry gains due to the increase in concentration. Our main application is to the linear Cournot and Bertrand models. A takeover is more likely under Bertrand competition if goods are substitutes and more likely under Cournot competition if goods are complements.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin	-
dc.relation	DIW-Diskussionspapiere 423	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	L13	-
dc.subject	D43	-
dc.subject	L41	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	Takeover bidding	-
dc.subject	Merger incentives	-
dc.subject	Oligopoly	-
dc.subject	Übernahme	-
dc.subject	Fusion	-
dc.subject	Oligopol	-
dc.subject	Duopol	-
dc.subject	Ökonomischer Anreiz	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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