On the choice of public pensions when income and life expectancy are correlated

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18126

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Borck, Rainald	-
dc.date	2003	-
dc.date.accessioned	2013-10-16T06:58:23Z	-
dc.date.available	2013-10-16T06:58:23Z	-
dc.date.issued	2013-10-16	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18126	-
dc.identifier	ppn:376881550	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18126	-
dc.description	The paper presents a model where public pensions are determined by majority voting. Voters differ by age and income. Moreover, life expectancy increases with income. Depending on the strength of the link between contributions and benefits, and the relationship between income and life expectancy, individually optimal tax rates may increase or decrease with income. If they decrease, high tax rates are supported by pensioners and poor workers. If they increase with income, the coalition for high tax rates consists of pensioners and rich workers. `Ends against the middle' equilibria are also possible.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.publisher	Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin	-
dc.relation	DIW-Diskussionspapiere 369	-
dc.rights	http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen	-
dc.subject	H55	-
dc.subject	D72	-
dc.subject	ddc:330	-
dc.subject	Voting	-
dc.subject	public pensions	-
dc.subject	life expectancy	-
dc.subject	Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung	-
dc.subject	Wahlverhalten	-
dc.subject	Einkommen	-
dc.subject	Sterblichkeit	-
dc.subject	Theorie	-
dc.title	On the choice of public pensions when income and life expectancy are correlated	-
dc.type	doc-type:workingPaper	-
Appears in Collections:	EconStor

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