Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18078| Title: | Doorkeepers and Gatecrashers: EU Enlargement and Negotiation Strategies |
| Keywords: | ddc:330 EU enlargement eastern enlargement bargaining reform war of attrition EU-Erweiterung Verhandlungstheorie Signalling Theorie Osteuropa war of attrition |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
| Description: | This paper discusses the eastward enlargement process of the EU in the framework of a simple war of attrition bargaining game. Both players – the existing EU members and the applicants – benefit from enlargement, yet for the applicants reform to the acquis is costly, while the EU prefers substantially reformed candidates. A waiting game unfolds. Within this framework the present enlargement round is analyzed and policy results are deduced. For example, it is shown that delegating the evaluation of applicants to a third party, compensating applicants for their reform efforts or increasing the benefits for new members are all effective negotiation strategies for the EU that have been applied in the process. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18078 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18078 ppn:369048555 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.