Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18078
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dc.creatorBrücker, Herbert-
dc.creatorSchröder, Philipp J. H.-
dc.creatorWeise, Christian-
dc.date2003-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T06:58:09Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T06:58:09Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/18078-
dc.identifierppn:369048555-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18078-
dc.descriptionThis paper discusses the eastward enlargement process of the EU in the framework of a simple war of attrition bargaining game. Both players – the existing EU members and the applicants – benefit from enlargement, yet for the applicants reform to the acquis is costly, while the EU prefers substantially reformed candidates. A waiting game unfolds. Within this framework the present enlargement round is analyzed and policy results are deduced. For example, it is shown that delegating the evaluation of applicants to a third party, compensating applicants for their reform efforts or increasing the benefits for new members are all effective negotiation strategies for the EU that have been applied in the process.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherDeutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin-
dc.relationDIW-Diskussionspapiere 342-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectEU enlargement-
dc.subjecteastern enlargement-
dc.subjectbargaining-
dc.subjectreform-
dc.subjectwar of attrition-
dc.subjectEU-Erweiterung-
dc.subjectVerhandlungstheorie-
dc.subjectSignalling-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.subjectOsteuropa-
dc.subjectwar of attrition-
dc.titleDoorkeepers and Gatecrashers: EU Enlargement and Negotiation Strategies-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
Appears in Collections:EconStor

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