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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18073| Title: | Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents |
| Keywords: | D83 D82 ddc:330 Soziales Netzwerk Informationsverbreitung Nash-Gleichgewicht Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
| Description: | A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. Information flow is two-way. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of certain star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We explore alternative model specifications to address potential shortcomings. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18073 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18073 ppn:370777174 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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