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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18073Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Haller, Hans | - |
| dc.creator | Sarangi, Sudipta | - |
| dc.date | 2003 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:58:09Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:58:09Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18073 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:370777174 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18073 | - |
| dc.description | A non-cooperative model of network formation is developed. Agents form links with others based on the cost of the link and its assessed benefit. Link formation is one-sided, i.e., agents can initiate links with other agents without their consent, provided the agent forming the link makes the appropriate investment. Information flow is two-way. The model builds on the work of Bala and Goyal, but allows for agent heterogeneity. Whereas they permit links to fail with a certain common probability, in our model the probability of failure can be different for different links. We investigate Nash networks that exhibit connectedness and super-connectedness. We provide an explicit characterization of certain star networks. Efficiency and Pareto-optimality issues are discussed through examples. We explore alternative model specifications to address potential shortcomings. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | - |
| dc.relation | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 337 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | D83 | - |
| dc.subject | D82 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Soziales Netzwerk | - |
| dc.subject | Informationsverbreitung | - |
| dc.subject | Nash-Gleichgewicht | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Nash Networks with Heterogeneous Agents | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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