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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18071Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Borck, Rainald | - |
| dc.date | 2003 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:58:07Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:58:07Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:369048423 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18071 | - |
| dc.description | This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | - |
| dc.relation | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 335 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | D72 | - |
| dc.subject | H77 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | tax competition | - |
| dc.subject | voting | - |
| dc.subject | Steuerwettbewerb | - |
| dc.subject | Steuersystem | - |
| dc.subject | Public Choice | - |
| dc.subject | Abstimmungsregel | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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