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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18071| Title: | Tax Competition and the Choice of Tax Structure in a Majority Voting Model |
| Keywords: | D72 H77 ddc:330 tax competition voting Steuerwettbewerb Steuersystem Public Choice Abstimmungsregel Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin |
| Description: | This note studies the choice of tax structure in a majority voting model with tax competition. Regions may tax mobile capital or immobile labor. Individuals differ with respect to their relative endowments of labor and capital. Even though a lump sum tax is available, the equilibrium capital tax in a jurisdiction may be positive. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will be true if the median capital endowment is smaller than average. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18071 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18071 ppn:369048423 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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