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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18065Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Borck, Rainald | - |
| dc.date | 2003 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2013-10-16T06:58:07Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2013-10-16T06:58:07Z | - |
| dc.date.issued | 2013-10-16 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/18065 | - |
| dc.identifier | ppn:368872882 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/18065 | - |
| dc.description | This paper analyzes voting on a linear income tax which is redistributed lump sum to the taxpayers. Individuals can evade taxes, which leads to penalties if evasion is detected. Since preferences satisfy neither single peakedness nor single crossing, an equilibrium may not exist. When it does exist, it may have interesting properties, in particular, the poor and the rich may form a coalition against the middle class. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) Berlin | - |
| dc.relation | DIW-Diskussionspapiere 329 | - |
| dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | - |
| dc.subject | D72 | - |
| dc.subject | H26 | - |
| dc.subject | ddc:330 | - |
| dc.subject | Tax evasion | - |
| dc.subject | redistribution | - |
| dc.subject | voting | - |
| dc.subject | Einkommensumverteilung | - |
| dc.subject | Einkommensteuerpolitik | - |
| dc.subject | Abstimmung | - |
| dc.subject | Steuervermeidung | - |
| dc.subject | Theorie | - |
| dc.title | Voting on Redistribution with Tax Evasion | - |
| dc.type | doc-type:workingPaper | - |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor | |
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