Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17927
Title: The complexity of economic policy: restricted local optima in tax policy design
Keywords: J22
H21
H2
ddc:330
Complexity
Optimal taxation
bouded rationality
learning
multiple equilibria
path dependence
Issue Date: 16-Oct-2013
Publisher: Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel
Description: Economists traditionally tackle normative problems by computing optimal policy, i.e., the one that maximizes a social welfare function. In practice, however, a succession of marginal changes to a limited number of policy instruments are implemented, until no further improvement is feasible. I call such an outcome a ?restricted local optimum?. I consider the outcome of such a tatonment process for a government which wants to optimally set taxes given a tax code with a fixed number of brackets. I show that there is history dependence, in that several local optima may be reached, and which one is reached depends on initial conditions. History dependence is stronger (i.e. there are more local optima), the more complex the design of economic policy, i.e. the greater the number of tax brackets. It is also typically stronger, the greater the interaction of policy instruments with one another – which in my model is equivalent to agents having a more elastic labor supply behavior. Finally, for a given economy and a given tax code, I define the latter?s average performance as the average value of the social welfare function across all the local optima. One finds that it eventually sharply falls with the number of brackets, so that the best performing tax code typically involves no more than three brackets.
URI: http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17927
Other Identifiers: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17927
ppn:557919428
RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:5518
Appears in Collections:EconStor

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