Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17781
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dc.creatorSchertler, Andrea-
dc.date2002-
dc.date.accessioned2013-10-16T06:56:42Z-
dc.date.available2013-10-16T06:56:42Z-
dc.date.issued2013-10-16-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/17781-
dc.identifierppn:351270655-
dc.identifier.urihttp://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17781-
dc.descriptionThis paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist?s incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.publisherKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel-
dc.relationKieler Arbeitspapiere 1117-
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen-
dc.subjectL14-
dc.subjectG28-
dc.subjectG24-
dc.subjectD82-
dc.subjectddc:330-
dc.subjectDouble-sided moral hazard-
dc.subjectpublic equity-
dc.subjectventure capital-
dc.subjectRisikokapital-
dc.subjectÖffentliche Kapitalbeteiligung-
dc.subjectSubvention-
dc.subjectUnternehmensgründung-
dc.subjectFinanzierungstheorie-
dc.subjectMoral Hazard-
dc.subjectTheorie-
dc.titleVenture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under Public Equity Schemes-
dc.typedoc-type:workingPaper-
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