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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17781| Title: | Venture Capitalists Investment Incentives Under Public Equity Schemes |
| Keywords: | L14 G28 G24 D82 ddc:330 Double-sided moral hazard public equity venture capital Risikokapital Öffentliche Kapitalbeteiligung Subvention Unternehmensgründung Finanzierungstheorie Moral Hazard Theorie |
| Issue Date: | 16-Oct-2013 |
| Publisher: | Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) Kiel |
| Description: | This paper analyses the impact of public equity schemes on venture capitalist?s incentives to finance start-up enterprises and to support the management teams. In a double-sided moral hazard model, it is shown that experienced venture capitalists, who have already financed start-up enterprises, reduce their intensity of management support under public equity schemes. However, public equity offers inexperienced venture capitalists, who have not yet financed start-up enterprises because of insuf-ficient experience, incentives to enter the venture capital market so that they can start to accumulate experience. |
| URI: | http://koha.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10419/17781 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/17781 ppn:351270655 |
| Appears in Collections: | EconStor |
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