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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/3142| Title: | Codes of Best Practice in Competitive Markets for Managers |
| Keywords: | Corporate Governance Incentives Moral Hazard Matching model |
| Description: | We study firms' corporate governance in environments where possibly heterogeneous shareholders compete for possibly heterogeneous managers. A firm, formed by a shareholder and a manager, can sign either an incentive contract or a contract including a Code of Best Practice. A Code allows for a better manager's control but makes manager's decisions hard to react when market conditions change. It tends to be adopted in markets with low volatility and in low-competitive environments. The firms with the best projects tend to adopt the Code when managers are not too heterogeneous while the best managers tend to be hired through incentive contracts when the projects are similar. Although the matching between shareholders and managers is often positively assortative, the shareholders with the best projects might be willing to renounce to hire the best managers, signing contracts including Codes with lower-ability managers. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from projects SEJ2006-00538-ECON, 2005SGR-00836, Consolider-Ingenio CSD2006-00016 and Barcelona Economics-Xarxa CREA. Peer reviewed |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/3142 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/3142 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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