Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2163
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dc.creatorLópez Pintado, Dunia-
dc.date2007-11-15T12:41:56Z-
dc.date2007-11-15T12:41:56Z-
dc.date2007-11-04-
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T00:58:41Z-
dc.date.available2017-01-31T00:58:41Z-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/2163-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2163-
dc.descriptionWe study a model where agents, located in a social network, decide whether to exert effort or not in experimenting with a new technology (or acquiring a new skill, innovating, etc.). We assume that agents have strong incentives to free ride on their neighbors' effort decisions. In the static version of the model efforts are chosen simultaneously. In equilibrium, agents exerting effort are never connected with each other and all other agents are connected with at least one agent exerting effort. We propose a mean-field dynamics in which agents choose in each period the best response to the last period's decisions of their neighbors. We characterize the equilibrium of such a dynamics and show how the pattern of free riders in the network depends on properties of the connectivity distribution.-
dc.descriptionFinancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science through grant SEJ2006-27589-E, FEDER and Barcelona Economics-XREA is gratefully acknowledged.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationUFAE and IAE Working Papers-
dc.relation718.07-
dc.rightsopenAccess-
dc.subjectFree ride-
dc.subjectIndependent set-
dc.subjectLocal public good-
dc.subjectMean field-
dc.subjectSocial network-
dc.titleThe Spread of Free-Riding Behavior in a Social Network-
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo-
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