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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2109| Title: | Feeding the Leviathan |
| Keywords: | Public Good Step-level Sanctioning Institution Cooperation Education Trust |
| Description: | Using a step-level public good game, we analyze the effects on contributions
of having played under a sanctioning regime. We find that ”educational” effects,
in terms of learning a particular way to coordinate towards ”good” equilibria, are
more relevant than motivational ”crowding out” effects, whereby cooperating to
avoid sanctions spoils intrinsic incentives. If groups vote, they decide to remove the
costly sanctioning regime; then they cooperate as much as in automatic removal
only when this decision entails a clear ”trust” message. Peer reviewed |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2109 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2109 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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