How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2106

Title:	How do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?
Keywords:	Prisoner's dilemma Payment cards Social conflict
Description:	A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Revisiting Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”. In this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in different categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all. Financial support from centrA: is acknowledged. Pablo Brañas acknowledges the hospitality of IESA-CSIC during this research. Antonio J. Morales acknowledges financial support from MCYT and FEDER grant number BEC 2002-02852.
URI:	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2106
Other Identifiers:	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2106
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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