Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2106
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dc.creatorBrañas-Garza, Pablo-
dc.creatorMorales, Antonio J.-
dc.date2007-11-14T08:46:22Z-
dc.date2007-11-14T08:46:22Z-
dc.date2004-05-05-
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T00:58:34Z-
dc.date.available2017-01-31T00:58:34Z-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/2106-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2106-
dc.descriptionA previous version of this paper was circulated under the title “Revisiting Cooperation in the Prisoners’ Dilemma”.-
dc.descriptionIn this paper we obtain the value that experimental subjects attach to a prisoners’ dilemma game by applying a related procedure to BDM (1964). We also obtain the value of a closely related game which does not incorporate any social dilemma. By comparing both values, we are able to classify subjects in different categories: (i) 16% of the subjects responded to the social dilemma by playing the cooperative strategy, (ii) The remaining subjects (84%) did not played the cooperative strategy and moreover, 53% of the subjects behaved as if the social dilemma was not an issue at all.-
dc.descriptionFinancial support from centrA: is acknowledged. Pablo Brañas acknowledges the hospitality of IESA-CSIC during this research. Antonio J. Morales acknowledges financial support from MCYT and FEDER grant number BEC 2002-02852.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationIESA Working Paper Series-
dc.relationWP 07-04-
dc.rightsopenAccess-
dc.subjectPrisoner's dilemma-
dc.subjectPayment cards-
dc.subjectSocial conflict-
dc.titleHow do subjects assess the Social Trade-off invilved in the Prisoners' Dilemma?-
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo-
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