How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2101

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Fatás, Enrique	-
dc.creator	Neugebauer, Tibor	-
dc.creator	Tamborero, Pilar	-
dc.date	2007-11-14T08:37:05Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-14T08:37:05Z	-
dc.date	2004	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:31Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:31Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2101	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2101	-
dc.description	The present paper reports on a political choice experiment with elected real-world politicians. A questionnaire on political and public issues is taken to examine whether prospect theory predicts the responses of experts from the field better than rational choice theory. The results indicate that framing effects exist but that expertise may weaken the deviation from rational choice.	-
dc.description	Authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Generalitat Valenciana (code CTIDIA/2002/208) and Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (code BEC2002-04380-C02-01).	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	IESA Working Paper Series	-
dc.relation	WP 10-04	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Subject pool effect	-
dc.subject	Subject surrogacy	-
dc.subject	Expected utility theory	-
dc.subject	Prospect theory	-
dc.title	How Politicians Make Decisions: A Political Choice Experiment	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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