Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2062
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dc.creatorAndersson, Staffan-
dc.creatorMartínez Cousinou, Gloria-
dc.date2007-11-13T14:52:22Z-
dc.date2007-11-13T14:52:22Z-
dc.date2006-
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T00:58:27Z-
dc.date.available2017-01-31T00:58:27Z-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/2062-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2062-
dc.descriptionExisting case studies of control of political corruption often lack a theoretical framework that can provide for systematic empirical research and comparisons between cases and countries. To remedy this, we apply principal-agent theory qualitatively to study the United Kingdom, with a particular emphasis given to an in-depth study of control measures employed to Parliament, the Executive and political parties. We give a detailed account of the approach undertaken to control political corruption in these risk areas for corruption, and discuss its implications and why some types of measures prevail over others.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationIESA Working Paper Series-
dc.relationWP 18-06-
dc.rightsopenAccess-
dc.subjectPrincipal-agent theory-
dc.subjectCorruption control-
dc.subjectDanger zone-
dc.subjectInstitutions-
dc.subjectUnited Kingdom-
dc.titleControlling Political Corruption in the United Kingdom-
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo-
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