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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2046Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Aguiar, Fernando | - |
| dc.creator | Brañas-Garza, Pablo | - |
| dc.creator | Miller, Luis M. | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-13T12:32:27Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-13T12:32:27Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-07-24 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:26Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:26Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/2046 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/2046 | - |
| dc.description | We perform an experimental investigation using a dictator game in which individuals must make a moral decision —to give or not to give an amount of money to poor people in the Third World. A questionnaire in which the subjects are asked about the reasons for their decision shows that, at least in this case, moral motivations carry a heavy weight in the decision: the majority of dictators give the money for reasons of a consequentialist nature. Based on the results presented here and of other analogous experiments, we conclude that dicator behavior can be understood in terms of moral distance rather than social distance and that it systematically deviates from the egoism assumption in economic models and game theory. | - |
| dc.description | The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support received from the Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (IESA-CSIC). Pablo Brañas-Garza acknowledges also the financial support received from DGCYT (SEJ2004-07554/ECO). | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | IESA Working Paper Series | - |
| dc.relation | WP 08-07 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Dictator games | - |
| dc.subject | Moral distance | - |
| dc.subject | Moral motivations | - |
| dc.subject | Experimental economics | - |
| dc.title | Moral Distance and Moral Motivations in Dictator Games | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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