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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1955| Title: | Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem |
| Keywords: | Division problem |
| Description: | The consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1955 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1955 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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