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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1955Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Massó, Jordi | - |
| dc.creator | Neme, Alejandro | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-08T15:35:47Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-08T15:35:47Z | - |
| dc.date | 1999-03 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:14Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:14Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1955 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1955 | - |
| dc.description | The consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents. Sprumont (1991) showed that if agents have single-peaked preferences over their shares, then the uniform allocation rule is the unique strategy-proof, efficient, and anonymous rule. We identify the maximal set of preferences, containing the set of single-peaked preferences, under which there exists at least one rule satisfying the properties of strategy-proofness, efficiency, and strong symmetry. In addition, we show that our characterization implies a slightly weaker version of Ching and Serizawa's (1998) result. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 434.99 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Division problem | - |
| dc.title | Maximal Domain Of Preferences In The Division Problem | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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