Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Beviá, Carmen	-
dc.creator	Corchón, Luis C.	-
dc.creator	Wilkie, Simon J.	-
dc.date	2007-11-07T18:08:16Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-07T18:08:16Z	-
dc.date	2001-07	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:14Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:14Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1947	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1947	-
dc.description	In this paper we present a set of axioms guaranteeing that, in exchange economies with or without indivisible goods, the set of Nash, Strong and active Walrasian Equilibria all coincide in the framework of market games.	-
dc.description	The first author thanks financial support from DGICYT and Direcció General de Recerca under projects PB98-0870 and SGR2000-00054. The second author wishes to acknowledge financial help from DGICYT under project PB98-0940.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	493.01	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Market Games	-
dc.subject	Implementation	-
dc.title	Implementation of the Walrasian Correspondence by Market Games	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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