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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1943| Title: | Stable Condorcet Rules |
| Keywords: | Social Choice Correspondences Condorcet Rules Stability Simpson Rule |
| Description: | We consider the following allocation problem: A fixed number of public facilities must be located on a line. Society is composed of $N$ agents, who must be allocated to one and only one of these facilities. Agents have single peaked preferences over the possible location of the facilities they are assigned to, and do not care about the location of the rest of facilities. There is no congestion. In this context, we observe that if a public decision is a Condorcet winner, then it satisfies nice properties of internal and external stability. Though in many contexts and for some preference profiles there may be no Condorcet winners, we study the extent to which stability can be made compatible with the requirement of choosing Condorcet winners whenever they exist. Our work is partially supported by DGCYT and Direcció General de Recerca under projects BEC2002-02130, and 2000SGR-00054. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1943 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1943 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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