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| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Burguet, Roberto | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T13:27:21Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T13:27:21Z | - |
| dc.date | 2000-01 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:13Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:13Z | - |
| dc.identifier | Investigaciones Economicas 24, 1 (2000), pp. 3-50 | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1937 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1937 | - |
| dc.description | I present an overview of what has been the theoretical analysis of auctions in the last two decades. The goal is to offer a systematic exposition of the main issues addressed by this literature, with more emphasis on why than on what. I present a unified framework that takes the reader through the analysis of both design and positive questions dealing with the workings of several standard institutions. At the end of the tour, the reader will find him or herself inside the realm of market design and the theory of price information. | - |
| dc.description | I acknowledge partial financial support from the Ministerio de Educación through CICYT Grant PB96-0897 and from the EC through HCM Network contract CHRX-CT94-0489. | - |
| dc.description | Peer reviewed | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Fundación SEPI | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 422.98 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Bidding models | - |
| dc.subject | Mechanisms | - |
| dc.subject | Market design | - |
| dc.title | Auction theory: a guided tour | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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