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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1919Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Jerez, Belén | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T11:01:35Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T11:01:35Z | - |
| dc.date | 2001-09-10 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:11Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:11Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1919 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1919 | - |
| dc.description | We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve randomization. Other properties of incentive efficient allocations are also derived. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 494.01 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Asymmetric information | - |
| dc.subject | Incentive efficiency | - |
| dc.subject | Linear programming | - |
| dc.subject | Duality | - |
| dc.title | A Dual Characterization of Incentive Efficiency | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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