Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1917

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Pérez-Castrillo, David	-
dc.creator	Macho-Stadler, Inés	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T10:58:02Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T10:58:02Z	-
dc.date	2001-10-02	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:10Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:10Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1917	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1917	-
dc.description	It is often argued that even if optimal ex-post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex-ante. We analyze the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex-ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex-ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected evenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	495.01	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Settlement	-
dc.subject	Tax evasion	-
dc.subject	Optimal auditing	-
dc.title	Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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