Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1909
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dc.creatorCaballé, Jordi-
dc.creatorAlonso Carrera, Jaime-
dc.creatorRaurich, Xavier-
dc.date2007-11-06T10:49:10Z-
dc.date2007-11-06T10:49:10Z-
dc.date2001-10-05-
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T00:58:10Z-
dc.date.available2017-01-31T00:58:10Z-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1909-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1909-
dc.descriptionWe analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subjected to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. We also discuss how consumption externalities and habits interact to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed to restore efficient decentralized paths.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationUFAE and IAE Working Papers-
dc.relation499.01-
dc.rightsopenAccess-
dc.subjectHabit Formation-
dc.subjectConsumption Externalities-
dc.subjectEquilibrium Efficiency-
dc.titleConsumption Externalities, Habit Formation, and Equilibrium Efficiency-
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo-
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