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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1901Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Barberà, Salvador | - |
| dc.creator | Massó, Jordi | - |
| dc.creator | Neme, Alejandro | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T10:27:50Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T10:27:50Z | - |
| dc.date | 2001-10-23 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:09Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:09Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1901 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1901 | - |
| dc.description | We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 501.01 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Voting | - |
| dc.subject | Strategy-proofness | - |
| dc.subject | Additive and Separable Preferences | - |
| dc.title | Voting by Committees under Constraints | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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