Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1901| Title: | Voting by Committees under Constraints |
| Keywords: | Voting Strategy-proofness Additive and Separable Preferences |
| Description: | We consider social choice problems where a society must choose a subset from a set of objects. Specifically, we characterize the families of strategy-proof voting procedures when not all possible subsets of objects are feasible, and voters' preferences are separable or additively representable. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1901 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1901 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.