Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1893

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Ponsatí, Clara	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T10:10:12Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T10:10:12Z	-
dc.date	2001-09-01	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:05Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:05Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1893	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1893	-
dc.description	Trabajo publicado como artículo en Contributions in Theoretical Economics 4(1): (2004).-- http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1099	-
dc.description	We study pair-wise decentralized trade in dynamic markets with homogeneous, non-atomic, buyers and sellers that wish to exchange one unit. Pairs of traders are randomly matched and bargaining a price under rules that offer the freedom to quit the match at any time. Market equilbria, prices and trades over time, are characterized. The asymptotic behavior of prices and trades as frictions (search costs and impatience) vanish, and the conditions for (non) convergence to walrasian prices are explored. As a side product of independent interest, we present a self-contained theory of non-cooperative bargaining with two-sided, time-varying, outside options.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	533.02	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Bargaining	-
dc.subject	Market Equilibrium	-
dc.subject	Outside Options	-
dc.title	Search and bargaining in large markets with homogeneous traders	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
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