Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1890

Title:	Structural Inferences from First-Price Auction Experiments
Keywords:	First-price auctions Private independent values Experimental data Structural econometric methods Non Linear Least Squares Constant relative risk aversion
Description:	We use structural methods to assess equilibrium models of bidding with data from first-price auction experiments. We identify conditions to test the Nash equilibrium models for homogenous and for heterogeneous constant relative risk aversion when bidders private valuations are independent and uniformly drawn. The outcomes of our study indicate that behavior may have been affected by the procedure used to conduct the experiments and that the usual Nash equilibrium model for heterogeneous constant relative risk averse bidders does not consistently explain the observed overbidding. From an empirical standpoint, our analysis shows the possible drawbacks of overlooking the homogeneity hypothesis when testing symmetric equilibrium models of bidding and it puts in perspective the sensitivity of structural inferences to the available information. Financial support from the European Commission through a EU-TMR ENDEAR Network grant (FMRX-CT98-0238) and from the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (Grant BEC-2001-0980) is acknowledged.
URI:	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1890
Other Identifiers:	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1890
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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