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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1878Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Abbink, Klaus | - |
| dc.creator | Brandts, Jordi | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T08:40:23Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T08:40:23Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-07-01 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:04Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:04Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1878 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1878 | - |
| dc.description | Trabajo publicado en Games and Economic Behavior 63(1): 1- 31 (2008) con el titulo 24. Pricing in Bertrand competition with increasing marginal costs.-- http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.09.007 | - |
| dc.description | We study the relation between the number of firms and market power in experimental oligopolies. Price competition under decreasing returns involves a wide interval of pure strategy equilibrium prices. We present results of an experiment in which two, three and four identical firms repeatedly interact in this environment. Less collusion with more firms leads to lower average prices. With more than two firms, the predominant market price is 24. A simple imitation model captures this phenomenon. For the long run, the model predicts that prices converge to the Walrasian outcome, but for the intermediate term the modal price is 24 | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 523.02 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Laboratory experiments | - |
| dc.subject | Industrial organisation | - |
| dc.subject | Oligopoly | - |
| dc.subject | Price competition | - |
| dc.subject | Co-ordination games | - |
| dc.subject | Learning | - |
| dc.title | 24 | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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