Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Porteiro, Nicolás	-
dc.creator	Pérez-Castrillo, David	-
dc.creator	Macho-Stadler, Inés	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T08:08:09Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T08:08:09Z	-
dc.date	2002-06-14	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:03Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:03Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1864	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1864	-
dc.description	We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	515.02	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Coalition formation	-
dc.subject	Bilateral Agreements	-
dc.title	Sequential Formation of Coalitions through Bilateral Agreements	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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