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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1862Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Camiña, Ester | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T08:04:23Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T08:04:23Z | - |
| dc.date | 2002-06-14 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:02Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:02Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1862 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1862 | - |
| dc.description | The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 514.02 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Matching | - |
| dc.subject | Assignment | - |
| dc.subject | Stability | - |
| dc.subject | Lattice structure | - |
| dc.title | A Generalized Assignment Game | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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