Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1861Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Klaus, Bettina | - |
| dc.creator | Klijn, Flip | - |
| dc.creator | Massó, Jordi | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T08:03:55Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-06T08:03:55Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:02Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:02Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1861 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1861 | - |
| dc.description | In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson in Am Econ Rev 89:748–780, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’, i.e., when Gale and Shapley’s (Am Math Monthly 69:9–15, 1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be anipulated by couples acting as singles. | - |
| dc.description | B. Klaus’s and F. Klijn’s research is supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The main part of F. Klijn’s work was supported by a Marie Curie Fellowship of the European Community Programme “Improving Human Research Potential and the Socio-economic Knowledge Base” under contract number HPMF-CT-2001-01232, carried out at the Departament d’Economia i d’Història Econòmica, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. The work of the authors is partially supported by Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.publisher | Springer | - |
| dc.relation | Review of Economic Design 11(3): 175-184 (2007) | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Matching | - |
| dc.subject | Couples | - |
| dc.subject | Responsiveness | - |
| dc.subject | Stability | - |
| dc.title | Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask) | - |
| dc.type | Artículo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.