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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1859| Title: | Efficient Priority Rules |
| Keywords: | Acyclical priority structuresss Deferred acceptance algorithm Indivisible objects Priority rules |
| Description: | We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm. L. Ehlers gratefully acknowledges financial support from the SSHRC (Canada). B. Klaus's research was partly supported by a Ramón y Cajal contract and Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1859 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1859 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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