Efficient Priority Rules

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Ehlers, Lars	-
dc.creator	Klaus, Bettina	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T07:57:45Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T07:57:45Z	-
dc.date	2002-12-09	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:02Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:02Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1859	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1859	-
dc.description	We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (houses, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and renegotiation-proofness. Such a rule respects an acyclical priority structure and the allocations can be determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.	-
dc.description	L. Ehlers gratefully acknowledges financial support from the SSHRC (Canada). B. Klaus's research was partly supported by a Ramón y Cajal contract and Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	554.02	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Acyclical priority structuresss	-
dc.subject	Deferred acceptance algorithm	-
dc.subject	Indivisible objects	-
dc.subject	Priority rules	-
dc.title	Efficient Priority Rules	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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