Preventive health care and payment systems to providers

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Pita Barros, Pedro	-
dc.creator	Martínez-Giralt, Xavier	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T07:46:02Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-06T07:46:02Z	-
dc.date	2002-03-25	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:58:02Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:58:02Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1852	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1852	-
dc.description	Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care. We present, both the normative and the positive analyses of the change from independent providers to integrated services. We show the evaluation of that change to depend on the particular way payment to providers is done. We focus on the externality resulting from referral decisions from primary to acute care providers. This makes our analysis complementary to most works in the literature allowing to address in a more direct way the issue of preventive health care.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	507.02	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Preventive health care	-
dc.subject	Payment systems to providers	-
dc.title	Preventive health care and payment systems to providers	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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