Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1843
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dc.creatorCasari, Marco-
dc.date2007-11-05T14:39:03Z-
dc.date2007-11-05T14:39:03Z-
dc.date2003-03-29-
dc.date.accessioned2017-01-31T00:58:01Z-
dc.date.available2017-01-31T00:58:01Z-
dc.identifierhttp://hdl.handle.net/10261/1843-
dc.identifier.urihttp://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1843-
dc.descriptionIn this paper we explore the effect of bounded rationality on the convergence of individual behavior toward equilibrium. In the context of a Cournot game with a unique and symmetric Nash equilibrium, firms are modeled as adaptive economic agents through a genetic algorithm. Computational experiments show that (1) there is remarkable heterogeneity across identical but boundedly rational agents; (2) such individual heterogeneity is not simply a consequence of the random elements contained in the genetic algorithm; (3) the more rational agents are in terms of memory abilities and pre-play evaluation of strategies, the less heterogeneous they are in their actions. At the limit case of full rationality, the outcome converges to the standard result of uniform individual behavior.-
dc.languageeng-
dc.relationUFAE and IAE Working Papers-
dc.relation583.03-
dc.rightsopenAccess-
dc.subjectBounded rationality-
dc.subjectGenetic algorithms-
dc.subjectIndividual heterogeneity-
dc.titleDoes bounded rationality lead to individual heterogeneity? The impact of the experimentation process and of memory constraints-
dc.typeDocumento de trabajo-
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