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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1834Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Massó, Jordi | - |
| dc.creator | Neme, Alejandro | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-05T12:56:36Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-05T12:56:36Z | - |
| dc.date | 2003-05-07 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:00Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:00Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1834 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1834 | - |
| dc.description | The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules. | - |
| dc.description | The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, and 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya. | - |
| dc.description | Peer reviewed | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 571.03 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Bribe-proofness | - |
| dc.subject | Strategy-proofness | - |
| dc.subject | Efficiency | - |
| dc.subject | Replacement Monotonicity | - |
| dc.subject | Single-peakedness | - |
| dc.title | Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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