Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1834| Title: | Bribe-proof Rules in the Division Problem |
| Keywords: | Bribe-proofness Strategy-proofness Efficiency Replacement Monotonicity Single-peakedness |
| Description: | The division problem consists of allocating an amount of a perfectly divisible good among a group of n agents with single-peaked preferences. A rule maps preference profiles into n shares of the amount to be allocated. A rule is bribe-proof if no group of agents can compensate another agent to misrepresent his preference and, after an appropriate redistribution of their shares, each obtain a strictly preferred share. We characterize all bribe-proof rules as the class of efficient, strategy-proof, and weak replacement monotonic rules. In addition, we identify the functional form of all bribe-proof and tops-only rules. The work of Jordi Massó is partially supported by Research Grants BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología, and 2001SGR-00162 from the Generalitat de Catalunya. Peer reviewed |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1834 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1834 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.