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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1832Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Socorro, M. Pilar | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-05T12:53:52Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-05T12:53:52Z | - |
| dc.date | 2003-05-02 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:58:00Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:58:00Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1832 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1832 | - |
| dc.description | We analyze the optimal technology policy to solve a free-riding problem between the members of a RJV. We assume that when intervening the Government suffers an additional adverse selection problem because it is not able to distinguish the value of the potential innovation. Although subsidies and monitoring may be equivalent policy tools to solve firms' free-riding problem, they imply different social losses if the Government is not able to perfectly distinguish the value of the potential innovation. The supremacy of monitoring tools over subsidies is proved to depend on which type of information the Government is able to obtain about firms' R&D performance. | - |
| dc.description | This research was undertaken with support from Generalitat de Catalunya, fellowship 2000FI 00481, and the research grant BEC 2000-0172. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 570.03 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | RJV | - |
| dc.subject | Moral hazard | - |
| dc.subject | Adverse selection | - |
| dc.subject | Subsidies | - |
| dc.subject | Monitoring | - |
| dc.title | Optimal technology policy: subsidies versus monitoring | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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