Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1799Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Pérez-Castrillo, David | - |
| dc.creator | Wettstein, David | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-05T11:19:13Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-05T11:19:13Z | - |
| dc.date | 2004-04-15 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:57:53Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:57:53Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1799 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1799 | - |
| dc.description | In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 609.04 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Networks | - |
| dc.subject | Implementation | - |
| dc.subject | Shapley value | - |
| dc.title | Forming Efficient Networks | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
Files in This Item:
There are no files associated with this item.
Items in DSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.