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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1796| Title: | Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities |
| Keywords: | Aspiration function Envy-free social choice function Fairness, implementation Indivisible goods |
| Description: | I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function. |
| URI: | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1796 |
| Other Identifiers: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1796 |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic |
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