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http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1796Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.creator | Veszteg, Róbert Ferenc | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-05T11:10:47Z | - |
| dc.date | 2007-11-05T11:10:47Z | - |
| dc.date | 2004-02-15 | - |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2017-01-31T00:57:53Z | - |
| dc.date.available | 2017-01-31T00:57:53Z | - |
| dc.identifier | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1796 | - |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1796 | - |
| dc.description | I analyze an economy with uncertainty in which a set of indivisible objects and a certain amount of money is to be distributed among agents. The set of intertemporally fair social choice functions based on envy-freeness and Pareto efficiency is characterized. I give a necessary and sufficient condition for its non-emptiness and propose a mechanism that implements the set of intertemporally fair allocations in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Implementation at the ex ante stage is considered, too. I also generalize the existence result obtained with envy-freeness using a broader fairness concept, introducing the aspiration function. | - |
| dc.language | eng | - |
| dc.relation | UFAE and IAE Working Papers | - |
| dc.relation | 613.04 | - |
| dc.rights | openAccess | - |
| dc.subject | Aspiration function | - |
| dc.subject | Envy-free social choice function | - |
| dc.subject | Fairness, implementation | - |
| dc.subject | Indivisible goods | - |
| dc.title | Fairness under Uncertainty with Indivisibilities | - |
| dc.type | Documento de trabajo | - |
| Appears in Collections: | Digital Csic | |
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