On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1794

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Casari, Marco	-
dc.date	2007-11-05T10:59:08Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-05T10:59:08Z	-
dc.date	2004-06-01	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:57:53Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:57:53Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1794	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1794	-
dc.description	We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it confounds the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	615.04	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Sanctions	-
dc.subject	Public goods	-
dc.subject	Cooperation	-
dc.subject	Experiments	-
dc.title	On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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