Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences

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DC Field	Value	Language
dc.creator	Vorsatz, Marc	-
dc.date	2007-11-05T10:35:19Z	-
dc.date	2007-11-05T10:35:19Z	-
dc.date	2004-08-09	-
dc.date.accessioned	2017-01-31T00:57:52Z	-
dc.date.available	2017-01-31T00:57:52Z	-
dc.identifier	http://hdl.handle.net/10261/1792	-
dc.identifier.uri	http://dspace.mediu.edu.my:8181/xmlui/handle/10261/1792	-
dc.description	In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.	-
dc.description	This research was undertaken with support from the fellowship 2001FI-00451 of the Generalitat de Catalunya and from the research grant BEC2002-02130 of the Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología of Spain.	-
dc.language	eng	-
dc.relation	UFAE and IAE Working Papers	-
dc.relation	617.04	-
dc.rights	openAccess	-
dc.subject	Approval Voting	-
dc.subject	Borda Count	-
dc.subject	Dichotomous Preferences	-
dc.subject	Social Choice Function	-
dc.title	Scoring Rules on Dichotomous Preferences	-
dc.type	Documento de trabajo	-
Appears in Collections:	Digital Csic

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